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SURVEY: WOMEN AND 
CALIFORNIA LAW 
by Carole Levine* 
This survey of California case law and legislation is a regu-
lar feature of the Women's Law Forum. The purpose of the Sur-
vey is to summarize all California Supreme Court cases, courts 
of appeal cases, and legislation enacted in the past year that is 
of special importance to women. The focus of the Survey is on 
presenting issues most pertinent to women, rather than on ana-
lyzing all issues raised in each case or bill. 
The survey period for cases in this issue is from June 1979 
through February 1980. Summaries of significant legislation en-
acted from October 1, 1978 to September 30, 1979 are also in-
cluded. We wish to thank the editors of California Women, a 
Bulletin published by the California Commission on the Status 
of women, for permission to reprint portions of their review of 
California legislation. 
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I. CRIMINAL LAW 
A. RAPE AND OTHER SEX OFFENSES 
1. Commitment Procedures for Mentally Disordered Sex 
Offenders 
People v. Saffell, 25 Cal. 3d 223,599 P.2d 92, 157 Cal. Rptr. 
897 (1979). Defendant was convicted of rape and sexual perver-
sion, and found to be a mentally disordered sex offender 
(MDSO) amenable to treatment. Pursuant to Welfare and Insti-
tutions Code section 6316.1, he was committed to a state hospi-
tal for a period of treatment equal to the upper term for the 
underlying criminal offenses, without time off for good behavior. 
The California Supreme Court, in reversing the court of appeal, 
found that defendant was not denied equal protection of the law 
even though non-MDSOs and MDSOs not amenable to treat-
ment would have been sentenced to a shorter prison term and 
allowed "good time" credit. The court reasoned that the imposi-
tion of the· upper term is necessary to further the compelling 
state purposes of 1) identifying and providing medical attention 
to those individuals amenable to treatment who commit sexually 
motivated criminal acts, and 2) assuring the safety of the public. 
The court further held that the legislative purposes underlying 
the provisions for "good time" credits in a prison setting are not 
necessarily suitable within a hospital setting. 
People v. Compelleebee, 99 Cal. App. 3d 296, 160' Cal. Rptr. 
233. (5th Dist. 1979). Mter trial, the lower court extended for 
one year the commitment period of a mentally disordered sex 
offender (MDSO). The court of appeal reversed, holding that the 
state must demonstrate that an MDSO can benefit from treat-
ment before a commitment extension will be granted. (Welfare 
and Institutions Code section 6316.2). In the present case, the 
evidence offered at trial was insufficient to support a finding 
that the defendant would benefit from the extension. 
2. Equal Protection Challenge to Statutory Rape Law 
Michael M. v. Superior Court, 25 Cal. 3d 608, 601 P .2d 572, 
159 Cal. Rptr. 340 (1979). In a four to three decision, the su-
preme court refused to compel the trial court to dismiss an in-
formation charging a minor with a felony violation of Penal 
Code section 261.5, unlawful intercourse with a female under 
5
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eighteen years of age. The court held that while the penal code 
section does classify both victims and offenders by sex, there is a 
compelling state interest in preventing teenage pregnancies that 
justifies the classifications. Thus, the statute meets the equal 
protection requirements of both the state and federal 
constitutions. 
3. Sufficiency of Evidence for Conviction of Rape and Great 
Bodily Injury 
People v. Thomas, 96 Cal. App. 3d 507, 158 Cal. Rptr. 120 
(2d Dist. 1979). Among other charges, the defendant was found 
guilty of raping and inflicting great bodily injury on an uncon-
scious woman. The evidence showed that the defendant had 
been seen walking in the vicinity of the crime; the victim could 
not see or identify her assailant because of the darkness; that 
after fainting, she awoke to find that she had been raped, badly 
bruised and had suffered a broken ankle, that the defendant had 
the same blood type as the rapist; and that a sweater, found in 
the defendant's car, had on it a leaf common to plants both in 
the victim's and the defendant's yard. The court of appeal af-
firmed the conviction, holding that while the evidence was cir-
cumstantial and admittedly weak, the jury was entitled to draw 
an inference of guilt. The court also held that the finding of 
great bodily injury in connection with the rape charge was war-
ranted because the victim's bruises and broken ankle had not 
completely healed by the time of the trial, six months following 
the offense. 
People v. Hall, 95 Cal. App. 3d 299, 157 Cal. Rptr. 107 (2d 
Dist. 1979). Defendant was charged with rape and forcible oral 
copulation. Mter preliminary hearing, the information was 
amended to include an allegation of infliction of great bodily in-
jury. The jury found defendant guilty of all three offenses. The 
court of appeal affirmed, holding that the information was prop-
erly amended because the evidence at the preliminary hear-
ing-including testimony that the defendant struck the victim 
with his fist numerous times-gave the defendant adequate no-
tice of the allegation. 
4. Admissibility of Evidence of Victim's Prior Sexual Conduct 
People v. Wall, 95 Cal. App. 3d 978, 157 Cal. Rptr. 587, 
Women's Law Forum 
6
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 10, Iss. 3 [1980], Art. 14
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol10/iss3/14
1980] CALIFORNIA LAW SURVEY 1293 
modified on denial of rehearing, 97 Cal. App. 3d 505a (1st Dist. 
1979). The defendant was convicted of rape by force and vio-
lence, and of false imprisonment. A former boyfriend of the vic-
tim testified that she had threatened to make a false accusation 
of rape against him. The trial court granted the prosecution's 
motion to strike the testimony, ruling that it was prohibited by 
Evidence Code section 787, which provides that evidence of con-
duct tending to demonstrate a character trait, may not be used 
to attack or support the credibility of a witness. The court of 
appeal reversed, holding that the testimony of the former boy-
friend was admissible under Evidence Code section 1103 subdi-
vision 1. This subdivision authorizes the use of character trait 
evidence in the form of specific instances of conduct, if offered 
by the defendant to prove conduct of the victim in conformity 
with the character trait. The court reasoned that Evidence Code 
section 1103 which is a narrow statute applicable only to crimi-
nal actions, takes precedence over section 787 which is a general 
statute applicable to both civil and criminal actions. 
People v. King, 94 Cal. App. 3d 696, 156 Cal. Rptr. 268 (2d 
Dist. 1979). Defendants were found guilty of forcible rape, sod-
omy and oral copulation. The trial court refused to permit the 
defendants to question the victim about the. circumstances sur-
rounding six prior rapes she had failed to report. The court of 
appeal affirmed, holding that evidence as to the circumstances of 
the alleged other rapes related to the nature of the victim's prior 
sexual conduct and fell within the ambit of questions proscribed 
by Evidence Code section 1103 subdivision (a). 
5. Governmental Immunity for Failure to Enforce Rape Laws 
Graham v. City of Biggs, 96 Cal. App. 3d 250, 157 Cal. Rptr. 
761 (3d Dist. 1979). Plaintiff alleged violations of her civil rights 
by a city and various city officials due to a city policy of nonen-
forcement of the rape laws. The complaint alleged that after be-
ing raped in her car, she reported the rape and identity of the 
rapist. The acting police chief and police commissioner refused 
to question the rapist and three men overheard discussing the 
rape. The plaintiff further alleged that the inaction of city offi-
cials denied her due process, equal protection, and the privileges 
and immunities of citizenship. The trial court entered judgment 
dismissing the plaintiff's complaint after sustaining defendant's 
demurrers without leave to amend. The court of appeal reversed, 
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holding that the allegations of the complaint were sufficient to 
state a cause of action for violation of the Federal Civil Rights 
Act of 1871. The court also held that the plaintiff's action was 
not barred by the immunity provisions of the California Tort 
Claims Act that provides for public entity immunity from liabil-
ity for an "injury caused by failure to properly enforce a law. 
6. Attorney's Failure to Request Psychiatric Examination of 
Victim 
In re Leonard M., 100 Cal. App. 3d 11, 160 Cal. Rptr. 631 
(2d Dist. 1980), appeal docketed, No. 79-1787, (U.S., May 9, 
1980). The juvenile court found that a sixteen year old boy had 
committed a lewd act on a six year old girl. The minor appealed, 
contending that 1) the evidence did not support the finding, and 
2) he was denied effective assistance of counsel when his attor-
ney failed to seek a psychiatric· examination of the girl. The 
court of appeal, in a two to one decision, affirmed the juvenile 
court's findings. The court determined that the child's testimony 
was not in conflict with the medical testimony and was sufficient 
to support the finding of the trial court. The court held that the 
failure of counsel to seek a psychiatric exam in child abuse cases 
is not incompetent representation as a matter of law (People v. 
Lang, 11 Cal. 3d 134, 520 P.2d 393, 113 Cal. Rptr. 9 (1974», and 
that in order to sustain an allegation of ineffective assistance of 
counsel, appellant must make an affirmative showing that his at-
torney's decision was based on ignorance of the law (People v. 
Jenkins, 13 Cal. 3d 749, 532 P.2d 857, 119 Cal. Rptr. 705 
(1975». 
7. Evidentiary/Procedural Error Prejudicial to Defendant 
People v. St. Andrew, 101 Cal. App. 3d 450, 161 Cal. Rptr. 
634 (1st Dist. 1980). The defendant, a hospital attendant, was 
convicted of rape by threat and forcible oral copulation on a 
mental patient. Prior to trial, the defense attorney's motion to 
disqualify the trial judge was denied for failure to meet procedu-
ral requirements. Testimony of a former mental patient that the 
defendant had kissed her was admitted to show defendant's pro-
pensity to use female patients for sexual gratification. The court 
of appeal reversed, holding that in a close criminal case, turning 
primarily on the respective credibility of the defendant and the 
alleged victim, any substantial error tending to discredit the de-
Women's Law Forum 
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fense or to corroborate the prosecution must be considered prej-
udicial. In the instant case the trial court was found to have 
committed substantial error in 1) admitting the testimony of the 
former patient for purposes of showing a continuing plan by de-
fendant to use psychiatric patients for sexual gratification, 2) 
failing to correct the motion to challenge the trial judge when all 
that was required was a simple statement by the judge of the 
procedural requirement necessary to make the motion success-
ful, and 3) refusing to allow the defense to cross examine the 
victim during the competency hearing. 
B. PROSTITUTION 
1. SUfficiency of Evidence for Conviction of Pimping 
People v. Kent, 96 Cal. App. 3d 130, 158 Cal. Rptr. 35 (1st 
Dist. 1979). The defendant was found guilty of pimping, pander-
ing, battery, and the intentional infliction of great bodily injury. 
The defendant appealed on the ground that his conviction was 
not supported by substantial evidence. The court pf appeal af-
firmed. The trial court record indicated that the defendant had' 
introduced a woman to prostitution and informed her of the 
techniques to be used. He delivered her each night to a selected 
street location and then picked her up the next morning, after 
which he collected all her earnings. When her income was below 
average, he often beat her, as a result of which she was hospital-
ized at least four times. The woman testified that she shared her 
earnings with him. The court of appeal also held that the trial 
court properly refused to instruct the jury on Penal Code section 
647(b), which provides that a person who solicits or engages in 
any act of prostitution is guilty of disorderly conduct, as a lesser 
offense necessarily included in the crimes of pimping and pan-
dering. The record indicated that the defendant, if guilty at all, 
was guilty of the crimes of pimping and pandering. 
C. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
1. Sufficiency of Evidence for Conviction of Felony Child 
Abuse 
People v. Jaramillo, 98 Cal. App. 3d 830, 159 Cal. Rptr. 771 
(2d Dist. 1979). The court of appeal affirmed rulings of the trial 
court that defendant mother was guilty of felony child endanger-
ing (Penal Code section 273a, subdivision (1», using a dangerous 
9
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weapon as a separate offense, and of inflicting great bodily in-
jury on one of her daughters. The mother had administered dis-
cipline to her daughters with a wooden dowel. The court found 
substantial evidence that the mother's actions were "likely to 
produce great bodily harm" within the meaning of Penal Code 
section 273a thus qualifying the violation as a felony. Further, 
the court determined there were sufficient facts on which to base 
a finding of great bodily injury (Penal Code section 12022.7), 
and that the dowel was a deadly weapon. 
D. LEGISLATION 
1. Rape 
A.B. 546 - Mori 
Chapter 994 
Statutes of 1979 
Spousal Rape. Establishes a separate category. Exempts 
individuals convicted of spousal rape from mandatory prison 
sentences and allows prosecution as a misdemeanor. 
S.B. 13 - Richardson 
Chapter 944 
Statutes of 1979 
Forcible Lewd and Lascivious Acts. Establishes forcible 
lewd and lascivious conduct as a crime and prohibits probation 
for that and other violent sex crimes. Creates a series of new and 
longer enhancements for repeat offenders and changes the 
method by which terms are calculated for violent offenses. Bars 
Youth Authority commitment for some repeat offenders, and 
changes sex offender registration procedures· and penalties for 
violation. 
2. Domestic Violence 
A.B. 265 - Nolan 
Chapter 367 
Statutes of 1979 
Child Abuse Pilot Project. Appropriates $80,000 for two 
child abuse project centers and requires $20,000 in local match-
ing funds. 
Women's Law Forum 
10
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 10, Iss. 3 [1980], Art. 14
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol10/iss3/14
1980] CALIFORNIA LAW SURVEY 
S.B. 9 - Smith 
Chapter 795 
Statutes of 1979 
1297 
Domestic Violence Prevention Act. Expands and strength-
ens the court's authority to enforce laws related to the .preven-
tion of domestic violence. Creates new categories under which 
temporary restraining orders may be issued. 
S.B. 355 - Presley 
Chapter 913 
Statutes of 1979 
Diversion Program for Domestic Violence Defendants. 
Under provisions of the program, individuals meeting specified 
requirements will be diverted from the criminal justice system 
and into an educational, treatment or rehabilitation program. 
S.B. 965 - Dills 
Chapter 129 
Statutes of 1979 
Temporary Restraining Orders. Amends section 527 of the 
Code of Civil Procedure. Extends from thirty to ninety the max-
imum number of days for which a court may issue a temporary 
restraining order. 
II. FAMILY LAW 
A. WRONGFUL DEATH AND NEGLIGENCE ACTIONS 
1. Emotional Distress/Loss of Consortium in the Absence of 
Physical Injury 
Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, 80 L.A. DAILY 
JOURNAL, D.A.R. 2397 (Aug. 28, 1980). The trial court sustained 
defendant's demurrer to a husband's complaint alleging negli-
gently inflicted emotional distress and loss of consortium, caused 
by emotional injury to his wife due to an erroneous diagnosis of 
syphilis. The complaint stated that defendant diagnosed the 
wife as having syphilis and subjected her to massive doses of 
penicillin. Blood tests established that the husband did not have 
the disease. Suspicions of extramarital sexual activities and mu-
tual hostility led to the breakup of the marriage. The appellate 
court modified the judgment to dismiss both causes of action on 
grounds that there is no recovery for negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress or loss of consortium absent physical injury. Writ-
11
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ing for the majority, Justice Mosk stated that the unqualified 
requirement of physical injury was no longer justifiable. The es-
sential question is one of proof of a serious and compensable in-
jury, to be presented to the trier of fact. Holding that similar 
reasoning applied to both claims, the judgment was reversed. 
2. Imputed Contributory Negligence in Loss of Consortium 
Action 
Lantis v. Condon, 95 Cal. App. 3d 152, 157 Cal. Rptr. 22 
(1st Dist. 1979), hearing denied, Nov. 2, 1979. Plaintiff brought 
suit for loss of consortium based on injuries to her husband from 
the collision of two trucks. The trial cpurt reduced the plaintiff's 
recovery by the proportion of negligence attributed to her 
spouse, the driver of one of the trucks. The court of appeal re-
versed, hold~ng that 1) contributory negligence may not be im-
puted merely 011 the basis of marital relationship and 2) loss of 
consortium is not a derivative action-although a wife's cause of 
action "arises" from the bodily injury to her husband, the injury 
suffered is personal to the. wife and is comprised of her own 
physical, psychological and emotional pain and anguish. 
3. Spouse's Extramarital Activities in Loss of Consortium 
Action 
Morales v. Superior Court, 99 Cal. App. 3d 283, 160 Cal. 
Rptr. 194 (5th Dist. 1979). In a wrongful death action, the trial 
court ordered plaintiff husband to answer interrogatories con-
cerning his extramarital sexual activities. The court of appeal di-
rected the trial court to modify its order so that the husband 
would not be required to give names, addresses and telephone 
numbers. The court held that evidence of extramarital sexual 
conduct is relevant to the nature of the personal relationship be-
tween husband and wife and thus to whether there was loss of 
love, companionship and sexual relations to the husband. How-
ever, since the trial court was dealing with the husband's consti-
tutionally protected right of privacy, it had to justify its impair-
ment of that right with a compelling state interest and draw its 
order with narrow specificity. The government objective of a fair 
trial would be served if the husband was required to state only 
whether, during some relevant period, he dated and had extra 
marital contacts with women and when those contacts took 
place. 
Women's Law Forum 
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B. INHERITANCE DETERMINATIONS 
1. Widow's Allowance Subject to Inheritance Tax 
Estate of Schley, 100 Cal. App. 3d 161, 161 Cal. Rptr. 104 
(1st Dist. 1979). The trial court upheld a widow's objections to a 
tax referee report that included the value of her widow's allow-
ance in the husband's estate for inheritance purposes. The al-
lowance was payable monthly during her life or until she remar-
ried. The court of appeal reversed, holding that because the 
legislature did not exempt pension rights under private plans 
from the inheritance tax and provided for the handling of con-
tingent interests in Revenue and Taxation Code section 13411 
subdivision (d), the legislature intended that benefits such as 
those under consideration were subject to the inheritance tax. 
The court rejected the contention that there was no transfer 
taking place at death within the meaning of the inheritance tax 
provisions. The court pointed out that 1) the pension rights were 
procured through expenditures of the decedent, 2) they were 
consideration for his employment rather than a gratuity, and 3) 
the fact that the transfer, made during decedent's lifetime, did 
not take effect in possession or enjoyment until the time of the 
decedent's death did not defeat the tax. The court also held that 
a transfer occurred even though the decedent had no right to 
name a successor, since the pension plan provided for a widow's 
monthly allowance and there was no evidence that he preferred 
any other arrangement. 
2. Apportionment of Life Insurance Proceeds Based on Na-
ture of Contributions 
Biltoft v. Wootten, 96 Cal. App. 3d 58, 157 Cal. Rptr. 581 
(4th Dist. 1979). The trial ~ourt ruled that the proceeds of a 
group life insurance policy must be apportioned between two 
beneficiaries according to the amount of community and sepa-
rate property funds paid toward its premiums. The decedent 
had been paying premiums out of his salary for nearly twenty 
years. He was married at the. time coverage began, but he and 
his wife separated eight months before his death. After separa-
tion, he changed the beneficiary designation on the policy from 
his wife to his children. The court of appeal affirmed, holding 
that the nature of the policy benefits was derived from the con-
tract which had its inception during the marriage and was pre-
served for almost twenty years by the payment of premiums out 
13
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of community funds. 
C. COMMUNITY PROPERTY 
1. Division of Quasi-Community Property 
In re Marriage of Fink, 25 Cal. 3d 877, 603 P.2d 881, 160 
Cal. Rptr. 516 (1979). In a dissolution proceeding, the trial court 
granted an interlocutory judgment and divided the couple's 
community property by using the asset distribution method. 
Subsequently, the husband moved for and was granted a new 
trial on the sole ground that there was an error in law regarding 
the division of quasi-community property held by the couple. 
The trial court had awarded certain real property in Florida to 
the husband and other Florida real property to the wife. The 
husband asserted that Civil Code section 4800.5 requires an in-
kind division. The Code section provides that real property in 
another state shall, if possible, be divided so that it is not neces-
sary to change the nature of the interests in such property. The 
supreme court modified the judgment and then affirmed. The 
court held that nothing in Civil Code section 4800.5 requires 
out-of-state real property to be divided in kind, and that the 
trial court was well within its discretion in concluding that it 
was impossible to achieve a practical and equal division of com-
munity property without affecting record title to the property. 
Because no errol' of law appeared to have been committed in the 
trial court's division of the community property, the court con-
cluded that the trial court erred in granting a new trial. 
2. Goodwill Valuation of Community Property Business 
In re Marriage of Winn, 98 Cal. App. 3d 363, 159 Cal. Rptr. 
554 (2d Dist. 1979). In a marriage dissolution proceeding, the 
trial court awarded a business found to be community property 
to the husband and required him to give the wife a note for one-
half its value. The trial court also awarded the wife spousal sup-
port of $500.00 per month for forty-two months. The court of 
appeal affirmed. Although community property is ordinarily di-
vided in kind, Civil Code section 4800 subdivision (b) provides 
that "where economic circumstances warrant, the court may 
award any asset to one party on such conditions as it deems 
proper to effect a substantially equal division of the property." 
The court held that while the business had no saleable value to 
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another, it had good will value to the husband and it was proper, 
under the statute, to compel him to pay for what he retained. 
The court also affirmed the order for spousal support. The hus-
band's financial statement showed he was capable of paying the 
amount and the wife, unemployed at the time of the trial, 
showed that she had been unsuccessful in securing work. 
In re Marriage of Slater, 100 Cal. App. 3d 241, 160 Cal. 
Rptr. 686 (1st Dist. 1979). In a dissolution proceeding, the trial 
court entered an interlocutory judgment· dividing the parties' 
community property and awarding the wife both spousal and 
child support. In dividing the community property, the court as-
signed a zero value to the husband's interest in the goodwill of 
his group medical practice. The court based its evaluation on the 
practice. partnership agreement that in the event of the hus-
band's departure from the group, his interest would be repur-
chased with no separate value given for goodwill. In order to 
equalize the division of community assets, the court ordered the 
husband to execute a promissory note in favor of the wife se-
cured by his interest in the group practice and bearing an inter-
est of ten percent per annum, payable annually. The court of 
appeal reversed for a redetermination of the husband's interest 
in the goodwill of his group practice. The court held that the 
wife was entitled to a share of the husband's interest in the 
practice as a going concern on the date of dissolution, an interest 
which could not be ascertained solely by reference to the part-
nership agreement, despite the fact that the wife had cosigned 
the agreement. The court further held that the award of a five-
year promissory note was an appropriate method of equalizing 
the division of community property. The note's actual value was 
not substantially less than its face value because it was secured 
by the husband's interest in his partnership; it bore a sufficiently 
high interest rate to compensate for inflation, and it was payable 
in full after a relatively short period. The court also held that 
the trial court had not erred in failing to consider the possible 
tax consequences of awarding the note to the wife, in the ab-
sence of any evidence that she would incur an immediate and 
specific additional tax liability. 
3. Division of Personal Injury Awards 
In re Marriage of Mason, 93 Cal. App. 3d 215, 155 Cal. 
Rptr. 350 (5th Dist. 1979). In a dissolution proceeding, the court 
15
Levine: California Law Survey
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1980
1302 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vo1.10:1287 
of appeal upheld the actions of the trial court in denying spousal 
support to the wife, and awarding the bulk of a $400,000 per-
sonal injury judgment to the husband. Civil Code section 4800(c) 
provides that. community property personal injury damages shall 
be assigned to the party who suffers the injuries. The personal 
injury judgment had been received as a result of the husband's 
permanently disabling injury. Despite the fact that the wife's 
name was placed on the instrument creating the trust fund in 
which the money damages were placed, the wife failed to offer 
evidence establishing that the initial trust instrument consti-
tuted the creation of her separate property. The court of appeal 
also affirmed the trial court's conclusion that the wife was capa-
bleof full-time employment and not in need of spousal support. 
4. Separate Property Funds Used for Community Residence 
In re Marriage of Trantafello, 94 Cal. App. 3d 533, 156 Cal. 
Rptr. 556 (2d Dist. 1979), hearing denied, Aug. 22, 1979. In a 
dissolution proceeding, the trial court annulled the marriage, di-
vided the community assets, and determinecf that the parties' 
family residence was the husband's separate property. The court 
of appeal reversed, holding that the husband had failed to pre-
sent evidence sufficient to rebut the presumption that the family 
residence was community property where 1) the title was taken 
in joint tenancy and 2) there was no evidence of a common un-
derstanding that the joint tenancy deed was to have a legal ef-
fect different from that given it by Civil Code section 5110. The 
court further held that in the absence of any communicated in-
tention to the contrary, a residence acquired during marriage by 
joint tenancy is community property regardless of the fact that 
the source of funds which went into its down payment is clearly 
traceable to the separate property of one spouse. A gift of sepa-
rate property funds to the community is presumed unless there 
is proof of an agreement between the parties to the contrary, 
and regardless of the marriage being declared a nullity. 
In re Mar1'iage of Sparks, 97 Cal. App. 3d 353, 158 Cal. 
Rptr. 638 (4th Dist. 1979). In a dissolution proceeding, the trial 
court awarded the wife a house built with her separate property 
funds but determined the land on which the house was built to 
be community property. Accordingly, the husband was given a 
credit for one-half the appreciated value of the land. The court 
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of appeal affirmed holding that 1) there was substantial evidence 
that the wife did not intend to make a gift of the house to the 
community, 2) the wife alone had authorized its construction, 
and 3) the money used to build the house had been a gift to the 
wife. 
5. Married Woman's Property Acquired by Written Instru-
ment 
In re Marriage of Ashodian, 96 Cal. App. 3d 43, 157 Cal. 
Rptr. 555 (2d Dist. 1979), hearing denied, Nov. 8, 1979. In a dis-
solution proceeding, the trial court rule that properties and pro-
ceeds acquired in the wife's name in connection with her real 
estate business were her separate property in accordance with 
the presumption raised by Civil Code section 5110. The section 
states that property acquired by a married w<?man prior to 1975 
by an instrument in writing, is her separate property. The court 
of appeal affirmed, holding that 1) Civil Code section 5110 is an 
exception to the general presumption that all property acquired 
after marriage is community property and 2) the section must be 
rebutted by clear and convincing evidence. The appellate court 
agreed with the lower court that the husband failed to rebut the 
presumption and that he had made a gift of his community in-
terest in the properties by his unwillingness to have any involve-
ment in the business, or to sign the grant deeds necessary to 
facilitate their transfer. 
6. Sale of Family Residence 
In re Marriage of Duke, 101 Cal. App. 3d 152, 161 Cal. 
Rptr.444 (4th Dist. 1980). A wife appealed from a portion of an 
interlocutory decree, contending among other things, that the 
trial court erred in failing to defer the sale of the family resi-
dence. The court of appeal remanded the case, holding that the 
trial court failed to exercise proper discretion in denying the 
wife's request to defer the sale where 1) the wife had been 
awarded custody of the two minor children who had lived in the 
house all their lives and wished to remain, 2) sale of the home 
would subject the wife to serious economic hardship including 
high interest rates, tight credit and increased market prices, and 
3) the husband's income was adequate to provide for his own 
needs and the court-ordered support of his former wife and 
children. 
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D. CHILD CUSTODY AND CONTROL 
1. Physical Handicap as Consideration in Custody Award 
In re Marriage of Carney, 24 Cal. 3d 725, 598 P.2d 36. 157 
Cal. Rptr. 383 (1979). In a dissolution proceeding, the trial court 
ordered a change in child custody from the father to the mother. 
The mother had relinquished custody by written agreement 
when the couple separated almost five years before and had not 
seen the children from the time of the separation until a few 
days prior to the hearing. The father was a quadriplegic as the 
result of an accident that occurred after separation while he was 
serving in the military reserve. The .trial court awarded custody 
to the mother on the ground of the father's disability which, it 
stated, would prevent a normal relationship between father and 
sons. The supreme court reversed the portion of the interlocu-
tory decree transferring custody of the minor children to the 
mother. The court held that in light of the capabilities of, and 
support services for physically handicapped, an accommodation 
can be made between the policies requiring that a custody award 
serve the best interests of the child, and the moral and legal ob-
ligation of soci,ety to respect the civil rights of the physically 
handicapped. It is impermissible for the trial court to rely on a 
physical handicap as prima facie evidence of a person's unfitness 
as a parent or of probable detriment to the child. 
2. Consent to Adoption by Presumed Father 
W.E.J. v. Superior Court, 100 Cal. App. 3d 303, 160 Cal. 
Rptr. 862 (2d Dist. 1980). In a proceeding by a husband and wife 
to adopt an eight month old child whose natural mother con-
sented to adoption at birth, the trial court awarded custody to 
the child's biological father who had also appeared in the pro-
ceeding seeking custody. The biological father was, at the time 
of conception and at the time of the proceeding, married to an-
other woman. The court of appeal directed the trial court to va-
cate its order and conduct a new hearing. Since the record 
showed that the natural father and the mother had never at-
tempted to marry, and that the child had never been in the fa-
ther's home, the court held that he was not a "presumed father" 
under Civil Code section 7004 subdivision (a), a part of the Uni-
form Parentage Act, and that his consent to the adoption was 
not required. The court further held, however, that the natural 
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father was entitled to be heard in opposition to the adoption 
proceeding and to present his own qualifications for custody. 
The court also held that Civil Code section 7017 subdivision (d), 
by permitting the adoption of a child with only the mother's 
consent, does not create an impermissible gender-based distinc-
tion. Over strong dissent, the court reasoned that a statutory 
scheme differentiating between fathers who have established a 
parental relationship and those who have not, is constitutional 
in light of the important state interest in protecting the best in-
terests of the child. 
3. Disputes Under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction 
Act 
Palm v. Superior Court, 97 Cal. App. 3d 456, 158 Cal. Rptr. 
786 (4th Dist. 1979). The father of a minor child, a resident of 
North Dakota, sought to compel the California superior court to 
stay its child custody proceedings. The court had determined 
that it had jurisdiction to hear the dispute under the provisions 
of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA). The 
father had already obtained the jurisdiction of the North Dakota 
Court to hear the same matter. The California court ordered the 
father to dismiss his North Dakota change of custody action, to 
refile it in California and to transfer custody of the child to the 
mother pending a full hearing. The court of appeal found that 
under the UCCJA, both California and North Dakota had juris-
diction over the custody of the child: California, because it was 
the home state of the child; North Dakota, because it was the 
home state of the father and the state which issued the original 
divorce custody decree. Further, the court of appeal directed the 
superior court to stay all proceedings under Civil Code section 
5155 subdivision (1) since 1) a custody proceeding intitiated by 
the father was already pending in North Dakota, 2) the relief 
sought by the mother amounted to a modification of the original 
North Dakota decree, 3) North Dakota, as the court which ren-
dered the initial custody decree, had continuing jurisdiction 
under the UCCJA and 4) there was nothing in the record to 
show North Dakota was not acting substantially in conformity 
with the Act. 
Allison v. Superior Court, 99 Cal. App. 3d 993, 160 Cal. 
Rptr. 309 (2d Dist. 1980). A father, the custodial parent living in 
Texas, sought dismissal in the California court of the mother's 
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order to show cause regarding contempt and modification of 
child custody. The show cause order was issued following the fa-
ther's refusal to permit the children to visit their mother in Cali-
fornia, in alleged contravention of a stipulated California cus-
tody order. Prior to the California hearing date, the father filed 
a petition in the Texas courts that resulted in an order purport-
ing to terminate the mother's visitation rights. The Texas hear-
ing was held in the mother's absence after three days notice and 
a denial of her request for a continuance. The mother subse-
quently petitioned the California court to modify custody and 
the father moved to dismiss the proceedings under the Uniform 
Child Custody Jurisdiction Act. The court of appeal denied the 
father's petition for mandate, holding that California acquired 
jurisdiction to make a child custody determination under Civil 
Code section 5152 subdivision (l)(b). The court further held 
that the California courts were not constrained by principles of 
comity from an appropriate exercise of jurisdiction since Texas 
was not a state exercising child custody jurisdiction substantially 
in conformity with the Uniform Act. (Civil Code sections 5154, 
5155). 
4. Removal of Child From Parental Custody 
Adoption of D.S.C., 93 Cal. App. 3d 14, 155 Cal. Rptr. 406 
(4th Dist. 1979), hearing denied, Sept. 12, 1979. The court of 
appeal affirmed a trial court decision declaring a minor child 
free from the custody and control of his natural father, and plac-
ing him with adoptive parents. Civil Code section 232(a)(4) pro-
vides that a minor may be taken from a parent convicted of a 
felony if the facts of the crime are of such a nature as to prove 
the unfitness of the parent. The court held that in determining 
whether the legal relationship between child and natural parent 
should be severed, the parental rights doctrine is not to be sub-
ordinated to the best interests of the child. Rather, to terminate 
parental rights, it must also be determined that the· parent 
whose rights are to be terminated is unfit, and that continuing 
parental custody would be detrimental to the child. In this. case, 
the father had spent the last thirteen years incarcerated for vari-
ous robbery offenses. The court concluded there was substantial 
evidence of parental unfitness and detriment to the child, and 
that allowing the adoption was in the child's best interest. 
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In re La Shonda B., 95 Cal. App. 3d 593, 157 Cal. Rptr. 280 
(2d Dist. 1979). In dependency proceedings arising out of the 
physical abuse of a child by her unmarried mother, the trial 
court dismissed the county's petition with prejudice and re-
leased the child to the custody of her father, who lived apart 
from the mother. The court of appeal reversed, holding that 
when there are two parents with separate homes, a child can be 
removed from the home of the unfit parent at the adjudication 
hearing without prejudicing the other parent's right to gain cus-
tody of the child at the second dispositional hearing. The court 
also held that the trial court erred in finding the father made a 
sufficient showing of his capability to provide parental care since 
1) he had no home of his own and 2) he was away so often that 
he intended to leave the child with relatives for full-time care. 
Finally, the court held that the trial court abused its discretion 
in dismissing the petition with prejudice. 
In re Jeanette S., 94 Cal. App. 3d 52, 156 Cal. Rptr. 262 
(5th Dist. 1979). The trial court entered judgment declaring a 
five-year-old child to be a dependent of the juvenile court and, 
pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 361 subdivi-
sions (a) and (b), removed the child from her mother's custody 
and control. The court of appeal upheld the trial court's order 
that the child be declared a dependent of the court but reversed 
the dispositional hearing. The court held that clear and convinc-
ing proof of parental inability to provide proper care for the 
child, and detriment to the child if she remains with the parents 
are both required before custody can be awarded to a non-par-
ent. Two reasonable alternatives were available to the trial court 
short of removing the child from the custody of her parents: 1) 
the child could have been returned to her mother under strin-
gent conditions of supervision, or 2) assuming that the mother 
was incapable of providing a suitable home, the child could have 
been placed with her divorced father .. 
In re Jacqueline H., 94 Cal. App. 3d 808, 156 Cal. Rptr. 765 
(2d Dist. 1979). The court of appeal affirmed a trial court termi-
nating a mother's parental rights to her minor daughter on the 
grounds of abandonment. The court of appeal upheld the trial 
court, finding that the mother had abandoned her child where 1) 
the child had been in a foster home for approximately four 
years, 2) the mother's failure to engage in psychological and 
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family counseling had resulted in the termination of her visita-
tion rights, and 3) she had made only a token effort to regain 
those rights. The court of appeal also held that because no mis-
carriage of justice appeared to have resulted from the trial 
court's failure to appoint counsel for the child, the error was 
harmless. 
5. Removal of Child From Adoptive Placement 
Marten v. Thies, 99 Cal. App. 3d 161, 160 Cal. Rptr. 57 (4th 
Dist. 1979), appeal docketed, No. 79-1850, (U.S., May 20, 1980). 
The trial court refused to compel the county adoption agency to 
return a minor child to its prospective adoptive parents. The 
agency had removed the child without advance notice because it 
believed that notice to the couple would place the child in immi-
nent danger. The evidence showed that the wife was emotionally 
unstable and dependant on the child for her emotional needs, 
that both the husband and wife were insensitive to the child's 
needs, and that the couple, in order to obtain the adoptive 
placement, had concealed their marital differences and had 
failed to report their subsequent separation as required by their 
agreement with the agency. The court of appeal affirmed, hold-
ing that there was substantial evidence to support the trial court 
finding that the child was in imminent danger and that removal 
from the home without prior notice was justified. The court also 
upheld the trial court's finding that to return the child to the 
adoptive husband and wife would be detrimental to the child. 
The appellate court rejected the wife's request, made in her re-
ply brief, that independent counsel could be appointed to re-
present the child when there was nothing in the record to sug-
gest that the agency had any concern other than the welfare of 
the child. 
6. Rights of Non-Custodial Parents 
In re Marriage of Oldfield, 94 Cal. App. 3d 259, 156 Cal. 
Rptr. 224 (1st Dist. 1979). A husband seeking modification of his 
visitation rights, was denied a request to have his former wife 
disclose her address, and was ordered by the trial court to pick 
up and return the children to the grandparents' home. The trial 
court also directed the husband to pay all mortgage payments 
and late charges which had accrued from the time he ceased us-
ing the community residence until the close of its sale. The court 
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of appeal affirmed the order requiring the husband to pick up 
and return the children to their grandparent's house, but re-
versed as to his obligation to pay all charges due on the family 
residence. The court held that, in the absence of any evidence 
showing it would be unwise for the husband to have his chil-
dren's address, the denial was an impermissible curtailment of 
his contact with them. As to the mortgage payments and late 
charges, the court held that the fact that a husband assumes the 
mortgage payments while he is living in the community resi-
dence does not alter the nature of the debt when the couple sep-
arates. Once the husband leaves the residence, each party should 
pay one-half the mortgage payments and late charges incurred 
until the close of the sale. 
E. SPOUSAL AND CHILD SUPPORT 
1. Enforcement of Child Support Orders 
In re Marriage of Moffat, 94 Cal. App. 3d 724, 156 Cal. 
Rptr. 609 (2d Dist. 1979), hearing granted, Oct. 11, 1979. The 
court of appeal affirmed a trial court order that a husband pay 
his former wife child support pursuant to the Revised Uniform 
Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (RURESA). After ob-
taining custody of the children under a prior judgment, the wife 
prevented her ex-husband from exercising his visitation rights 
although he was paying spousal and child support pursuant to 
court order. The court found her in contempt and excused the 
husband from making spousal or child support payments until 
she complied with the court order. The wife then moved to an-
other state and filed for child support payments under the Act. 
The court of appeal held that refusal of visitation does not pre-
vent a wife from pursuing child support under the Revised Act. 
The court also held that the prior court order excusing the hus-
band's duty of support pending his wife's cooperation with his 
rights of visitation was not res judicata and did not render the 
subsequent order for child support invalid. 
In re Marriage of Thompson, 96 Cal. App. 3d 621, 158 Cal. 
Rptr. 160 (4th Dist. 1979). An interlocutory judgment of dissolu-
tion contained no order for child support, however, the court 
maintained jurisdiction to modify the provision. Soon after sepa-
ration, the husband was jailed for attempting to abduct the par-
ties' two children. The wife filed a motion seeking modification 
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of child support. The court awarded child support on the condi. 
tion that an allotment could be obtained from the Navy to pay 
support while the husband was in custody. The husband imme· 
diately appealed the order. When he failed to comply with the 
terms of the child support order, he was held in contempt and 
directed to execute the documents necessary to obtain the Navy 
allotment. The court of appeal affirmed, holding that 1) modifi· 
cation of the support provisions of an otherwise final judgment 
of dissolution is permitted, 2) the filing of a notice of appeal 
does not necessarily stay the order which is being appealed, 3) 
the trial court properly used a contempt proceeding to enforce 
its child support order and 4) the trial court did not err in 
awarding the husband's truck to the wife as partial payment of 
child support . 
. 
In re Marriage of Popenhager, 99 Cal. App. 3d 514, 160 Cal. 
Rptr. 379 (1st Dist. 1979). In February 1969, a trial court en· 
tered an interlocutory decree awarding a wife $200 per month 
child support. She subsequently moved to another state and, 
under the provisions of the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of 
Support Act (URESA) sought to enforce the terms of her inter· 
locutory decree. In June 1969, at a California hearing on the re· 
ciprocal action, the husband stated that he could only pay a 
maximum of thlrty dollars per month and was ordered to pay 
that sum. The tlial court made no mention of the existing inter· 
locutory judgment. The husband made payments sporadically, 
and in 1977, the wife again sought to enforce the original order. 
The California court issued a writ of execution for arrearages 
amounting to over $18,000.00, representing the total amount for 
child support owed under the interlocutory decree less the 
amounts paid by the husband pursuant to the reciprocal action 
order of $30.00 per month. The husband moved to quash the 
writ and consolidate all proceedings. The trial court granted his 
motion to reduce child support and to modify arrearages to the 
thirty dollars per month specified in the reciprocal action order. 
The trial court specifically found that the reciprocal order action 
superseded the support provisions of the original decree. The 
court of appeal reversed and remanded. The court held that 
under former Code of Civil Procedure section 1689, a reciprocal 
support order did not act to supersede a prior order arising from 
a dissolution action where no specific plea for modification had 
been made. Accordingly, the husband was continuously obli-
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gated to pay child support obligations at the rate of $200.00 per 
month up until the 1977 modification. The court further held it 
error to deny interest on arrearages, and to deny attorney fees in 
the absence of findings on the parties' income and need. 
In re Marriage of DeMore, 93 Cal. App. 3d 785, 155 Cal. 
Rptr. 899 (1st Dist. 1979). The court of appeal reversed a trial 
order that a mother was not entitled to a wage assignment for 
overdue child support. Civil Code section 4701(b) provides that 
a trial court shall order a defaulting parent to assign wages once 
a finding is made that child support payments are in arrears in a 
sum equal to the amount of two months' payment. The order is 
mandatory despite the fact that the defaulting parent has subse-
quently paid the arrearages. The court found that the statute 
bears a rational relationship to a valid state interest and does 
not deprive the non-custodial parent of due process. 
In re Marriage of Hudson, 95 Cal. App. 3d 72, 156 Cal. 
Rptr. 849 (1st Dist. 1979). In a proceeding to enforce child sup-
port payments, the court of appeal affirmed the trial court order 
that a husband pay his former wife arrearages of child support 
due beyond the ten-year period from entry of the original judg-
ment. Although the former wife did not file an affidavit, the 
court held that a combination of her written declaration and her 
testimony at trial constituted substantial compliance with Code 
of Civil Procedure section 685. Section 685 provides that a judg-
ment may be enforced after the lapse of ten years from the date 
of its entry by leave of the court on a motion, accompanied by 
an affidavit setting forth the reasons for failure to proceed with 
enforcement within ten years. 
2. Definition of Cohabitation for Purposes of Reduced Spousal 
Support 
In re Marriage of Thweatt, 96 Cal. App. 3d 530, 157 Cal. 
Rptr. 826 (4th Dist. 1979). A wife filed contempt proceedings 
against her former husband for his failure to pay spousal sup-
port. At the hearing, the husband moved for a reduction or ter-
mination of the spousal support on the ground that his wife was 
cohabiting with another man and his son, thus creating a rebut-
table presumption of decreased need for support under Civil 
Code section 4801.5. The trial court denied the husband's mo-
tion and found him in contempt of court. The court of appeal 
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affirmed, holding that in the absence of a sexual, romantic or 
.J 
homemaker-companion relationship, the presence of two male 
boarders sharing expenses with the wife did not amount to co-
habitation within the meaning of the statute. The court also 
held that there was no evidence of an actual decreased need on 
the part of the wife, who was fifty years old and unemployed. 
3. County Right to Reimbursement for Public Assistance 
Payments 
Amie v. Superior Court, 99 Cal. App. 3d 421, 160 Cal. Rptr. 
271 (4th Dist. 1979). The county sought to establish child sup-
port and be reimbursed for public assistance from the noncus-
todial father of a minor child. The father demurred to the extent 
that the county demanded recovery of money paid for the sup-
port of the child more than three years prior to the filing of the 
complaint, The trial court overruled the demm'rer and the father 
than sought a writ of mandate. The court of appeal initially de-
nied the writ but the supreme court remanded with directions to 
issue an alternative writ. The appellate court then held that 1) 
the county's action, based on Welfare and Institutions Code sec-
tion 11350 and Civil Code section 248 is subject to the three year 
limitation period of Code of Civil Procedure 338 subdivision (1), 
2) a noncustodial parent is not required to reimburse another for 
support furnished to a child in the absence of an order or agree-
ment, and 3) the county has no right to reimbursement derived 
by way of assignment or subrogation, from the childs' right to 
parental support. 
County of Los Angeles v. Ferguson, 94 Cal. App, 3d 549, 156 
Cal. Rptr. 565 (2d Dist. 1979). In an action brought by the 
county on behalf of a minor child against his father for child 
support, the triSll court granted judgment on the pleadings for 
defendant on the basis of 1) deficiencies in the form complaint, 
2) the county's failure to state that the child was receiving pub-
lic assistance, and 3) the complaint's failure to state that the 
father was in default of a valid order for child support in exis-
tence in another county. The court of appeal affirmed, holding 
that a complaint brought by the county under the provisions of 
Welfare and Institutions Code sections 11350.1 and 11475.1 
must plead that the county has standing to sue based on the 
minor or his mother being granted aid by the county or on the 
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district attorney being asked to enforce a support obligation on 
behalf of the individual for whom the support order was made. 
The court also held that the county's action was superseded by a 
prior judgment made in another county pursuant to the Family 
Law Act. The court noted that the appropriate action in a case 
where there is an existing order for support in Family Law Act 
proceedings is by an order to show cause in the same proceeding. 
4. Availability of Step-Parent Income in Determining Child-
Support Obligation 
In re Marriage of Brown, 99 Cal. App. 3d 702, 160 Cal. 
Rptr. 524 (3d Dist. 1979). A former husband, who had custody of 
the couples' three children, sought an order to compel his former 
wife to pay child support. As part of the proceedings, he ob-
tained a subpoena ordering the deposition of the wife's present 
husband and the production of income tax returns filed during 
the second marriage. The present husband appeared at the dep-
osition, but refused to produce the income tax returns and re-
fused to testify, asserting spousal privilege. The first husband 
sought sanctions on the ground that Civil Code section 250 pre-
cluded the assertion of the marital privilege in child support 
proceedings. The trial court granted the second husband's mo-
tion to quash the subpoena. The court of appeal affirmed, hold-
ing that the trial court properly allowed the present husband to 
assert the privilege. The court pointed out that Revenue and 
Taxation Code section 19282, which prohibits disclosure of re-
turns by the Franchise Tax Board, is construed to render both 
state and federal income tax returns privileged. To require the 
present husband to disclose his returns would be contrary to the 
public policy and interest in the preservation of existing marital 
relationships. 
Camp v. Swoap, 94 Cal. App. 3d 733, 156 Cal. Rptr .. 600 (3d 
Dist. 1979). The trial court held invalid the administrative regu-
lations under which a specified portion of a nonadoptive stepfa-
ther's income was considered available for the support of is 
wife's children from a prior relationship. Also determined to be 
invalid was the practice of deducting such an amount from the 
aid to families with dependent children (AFDC) grant that 
would otherwise be paid on behalf of the children. The trial 
court, relying primarily on Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973) 
and U. S. Department of Agriculture v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508 
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(1973), held that the regulations denied AFDC recipients due 
process of law by conclusively presuming that a nonadoptive 
stepfather would make his wife's community property interest in 
his earnings available to her for the support of her children. The 
trial court also held that the state rules conflicted with federal 
regulations governing the administration of the AFDC program·, 
under which only the income of a natural, adoptive, or legally 
obligated parent could be considered available for children in 
the household, absent proof of actual contribution. The court of 
appeal, relying on Weinberger v. Salli, 422 U.S. 749 (1975), re-
jected the trial court's ruling that a conclusive presumption of 
income availability violates due process since the legislature 
could have validly determined that limited AFDC resources 
would not be well spent in making individual assessments of 
stepfather income availability. However, it upheld the trial 
court's holding that the state rules were incompatible with fed-
eral regulatory provisions barring states from assuming that per-
sons not legally responsible would apply their resources to aid 
dependant children. 
5. Payment of Community Obligations as Spousal Support 
In re Marriage of Chala, 92 Cal. App. 3d 996, 155 Cal. Rptr. 
605 (2d Dist. 1979). In a dissolution proceeding, the trial court 
required the husband to pay all community obligations, but con-
sidered one-half of the payments to be spousal support. The 
court of appeal reversed, holding that community assets and ob-
ligations must be divided equally when the community assets 
exceed the community obligations. In appropriate circumstances 
a spouse can be ordered to pay continuing community debts as 
spousal support. Those circumstances are: 1) when the payment 
is to third parties for the future living expenses of the supported 
spouse; 2) when the supporting spouse's payment of past debts 
will protect the supported spouse's future alimony money from 
the reach of creditors; and 3) when the supporting spouse's post-
separation, pre-trial payment of debts is in reality"'a discharge of 
the paying spouse's duty to support the other spouse. None of 
the circumstances set forth were present in t1ais case. The trial 
court also failed to follow the criteria for spousal support set 
forth in Civil Court section 4801, making the resultant division 
of community property unequal. 
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In re Marriage of Marx, 92 Cal. App. 3d 984, 155 Cal. Rptr. 
609 (2d Dist. 1979). The court of appeal reversed the trial 
court's division of community property in a dissolution proceed-
ing, holding that a husband cannot be ordered to pay commu-
nity obligations as additional spousal support when the wife has 
already been awarded a reasonable monthly support sum. In ad-
dition, such a disposition violates Civil Code section 4801(b) in 
that it requires the husband to pay the debt regardless of the 
wife's remarriage or death before full payment is made. The 
court of appeal held that under In re Marriage 0/ Brigden, 80 
Cal. App. 3d 380, 145 Cal. Rptr. 716 (2d Dist. 1978), absent eco-
nomic circumstances warranting the assignment of an entire as-
set to one spouse, Civil Code section 4800 (b)(l) requires equal 
in kind division. Further, it was error for the trial court to award 
to the husband all of the community-owned pension fund when 
he did not want the fund and when an inequitable tax conse-
quence would result. 
In re Marriage of Marx, 97 Cal. App. 3d 552, modified, 98 
Cal. App. 3d 533c, 159 Cal. Rptr. 215 (2d Dist. 1979). In a disso-
lution proceeding, the trial court divided the community prop-
erty, awarding the wife the family residence. The husband was 
ordered to pay spousal and child support, and was also ordered 
to pay a community obligation as additional spousal support. 
The husband was awarded his pension fund at the face value of 
the contributions deposited in it. The court of appeal reversed 
the part of the order which required the husband to pay the 
community obligation and affirmed all other aspects of the judg-
ment. The court held that the debt should have been equally 
divided between the parties since the wife had been given rea-
sonable monthly support and there was no need to increase that 
support by ordering the husband to assume responsibility for 
the obligation. The court also held that the assignment of the 
pension fund at its face value to the husband was proper. There 
was no need to take into consideration the future taxes to be 
paid by the husband when he received the fund since the taxes 
. were not immediate and specific but were payable in the future 
with the exact amount being speculative. 
6. Modification of Spousal Support 
In re Marriage of Kilkenny, 96 Cal. App. 3d 617, 158 Cal. 
Rptr. 158 (4th Dist. 1979). The trial court denied a husband's 
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motion for modification of spousal support paid by him to his 
former wife. The support obligation was originally set out in a 
separation agreement which provided that its terms were "abso-
lute, unconditional and irrevocable." The separation agreement 
was later incorporated into the interlocutory and final decrees of 
dissolution. The court of appeal affirmed, holding that the sup-
port agreement was nonmodifiable under Civil Code section 4811 
subdivision (b), which provides that an agreement for spousal 
support is not modifiable if there is a written or oral agreement 
for spousal support in open court specifically providing that the 
support agreement is not modifiable. The court stated that the 
terms "absolute, unconditional irrevocable," were intended to 
prohibit modification of spousal ~upport by a later court decree. 
7. Supporting Spouse's Ability to Earn as Standard for Sup-
port Award 
In re Marriage of Wyatt, 98 Cal. App. 3d 898, 159 Cal. 
Rptr. 784 (1st Dist. 1979). An ex-husband sought termination of 
his obligation to pay spousal support. Instead, the trial court 
substantially reduced his monthly support obligation on the ba-
sis of the continued decline in profits of his business. Both par-
ties appealed and the court of appeal affirmed, holding that the 
trial court properly based its award on the husband's ability to 
earn rather than his actual income. The court rejected the hus-
band's contention that the ability-to-pay standard may only be 
used when it appears there is a deliberate attempt to avoid 
family financial responsibility. The court also held that the trial 
court adequately considered the amount of the wife's separate 
property before making the award. 
F. HEALTH ANI!) WELFARE ISSUES 
1. Public Funding of Abortion 
t Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers, 93 
Cal. App. 3d 492, 156 Cal. Rptr. 73 (1st Dist. 1979), hearing 
t Because the California Supreme Court has granted a hearing in this case, the 
court of appeal opinion is of no force or effect and is no longer an authoritative state-
ment of any principle of law. 5 CAL. JUR. 2d, Appellate Review § 434 (1952), citing 
Knouse v. Nimocks, 8 Cal. 2d 482, 66 P.2d 438 (1937). This case appears in the Survey 
for the sole purpose of familiarizing the reader with issues presently pending before the 
high court. 
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granted, Sept. 12, 1979. The trial court granted a temporary re-
straining order against implementation of provisions of the 
state's Budget Act of 1978 which restricted the circumstances 
under which public funds could be used to pay for abortions for 
Medi-Cal recipients. The trial court refused to issue a prelimi-
nary injunction, but stayed the denial pending outcome of the 
appeal. The court of appeal reversed and remanded with direc-
tions to enjoin implementation of the Act only to the extent nec-
essary to conform with the court's views. Over a well-reasoned 
dissent, the appellate court held that the Budget Act did not 
deny indigent women equal protection under either the federal 
or state constitution. The state is not required to show a compel-
ling state interest in justifying its policy choice. The distinction 
drawn between childbirth and elective abortions by the Act's 
funding restrictions is rationally related to the state's legitimate 
interest in favoring normal childbirth. The court of appeal also 
rejected the contention that the state's decision not to fund elec-
tive abortions violates the free exercise and the establishment of 
religion clauses of the United States Constitution. When a law is 
attacked on establishment of religion grounds, the court must 
consider whether it furthers any of the primary evils which the 
clause was intended to forestall, i.e., financial support for or in-
volvement in a religious activity. The right of a woman to choose 
to terminate her pregnancy is fundamental. The legislature has 
not prohibited elective abortions but merely chosen not to use 
public funds to pay for the elective abortions of any women, 
whatever their religious p~rsuasion or economic status. 
2. Class Action Against Manufacturers for DES Induced In-
jury During Pregnancy 
Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 
924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1980). The plaintiff, injured as a result 
of a drug administered to her mother during pregnancy, brought 
a class action against eleven drug companies who were manufac-
turers of diethylstilbestrol (DES). She alleged that they were 
jointly liable for manufacturing, marketing, and promoting DES 
asa safe drug for preventing miscarriage without adequate test-
ing. 'Plaintiff further alleged that all the named defendants pro-
duced the drug from an industry-wide formula. Because plaintiff 
could not identify the manufacturer of the specific DES which 
caused her injuries, the trial court sustained defendants' demur-
rers without leave to amend. 
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In a landmark decision, the supreme court reversed, noting 
that "in an era of mass production and complex marketing 
methods the traditional standard of negligence [is] insufficient 
to govern obligations of manufacturer to consumer .... [Slome 
adaptation of the rules of causation and liability may be appro-
priate .... " The court held that: 1) plaintiff's obligation is to 
join in the action the manufacturers of a substantial share of the 
DES produced; 2) the extent of a defendant-manufacturer's lia-
bility may be measured by the amount of DES produced by a 
manufacturer in proportion to the entire amount of DES sold to 
the public; and 3) the burden of proof must shift to defendants 
to demonstrate that they could not have produced the particular 
substance which injured plaintiff. 
G. DISSOLUTION PROCEEDINGS 
1. Nunc Pro Tunc Decree to Validate Otherwise Bigamous 
Marriage 
Coefield v. Coefield, 92 Cal. App. 3d 959, 155 Cal. Rptr. 335 
(2d Dist. 1979). The trial court denied the motion of the puta-
tive wife of a deceased spouse for a nunc pro tunc order di-
recting the entry of a final decree of dissolution of the marriage 
of the deceased and his prior wife, pursuant to Civil Code sec-
tion 4515. The court of appeal reversed the lower court. A com-
mon law marriage, valid where contracted, is recognized as valid 
in California. Civil Code section 4515 requires that, in order for 
a nunc pro tunc decree to validate an otherwise bigamous mar-
riage, the second marriage must follow the nunc pro tunc date. 
Here the second marriage preceded both the interlocutory de-
cree of marriage and the proposed nunc pro tunc date. However, 
since the putative spouse and her deceased husband had held 
themselves out to be husband and wife in two states recognizing 
common law marriages after the proposed nunc pro tunc date, 
the court held that the putative spouse could claim the status of 
a valid common law wife under the laws of either of those two 
states at a time after the proposed nunc pro tunc date. 
2. Entry of Final Decree Conditioned on Reimbursement to 
County 
In re Marriage of Sanabia, 95 Cal. App. 3d 483, 157 Cal. 
Rptr. 56 (4th Dist. 1979). A wife obtained by default an interloc-
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utory decree of dissolution. The trial court conditioned entry of 
final judgment on reimbursement to the county of a filing fee 
previously waived because of the wife's indigency, and ordered 
her to partially reimburse the county for welfare child support 
payments. The court of appeal reversed, holding that the trial 
court lacked jurisdiction to condition entry of the final decree on 
the wife's reimbursement of the filing fee. The court also held 
that the trial court could not order the sale of the community 
stereo set to pay for the filing fee since the stereo is considered a 
necessary household furnishing or appliance and is exempt from 
execution. (Code of Civil Procedure section 690.1) Finally, the 
court held that federal and state law limits the county's claim 
for reimbursement of child support to non-custodial parents. 
Because the wife had custody of the minor children and was eli-
gible for welfare, the reimbursement order was improper. 
3. Willful Violation of Discovery Orders 
In re Marriage of Stallcup, 97 Cal. App. 3d 294, 158 Cal. 
Rptr. 679 (3d Dist. 1979), modified on denial of rehearing, 98 
Cal. App. 3d 533d. In an interlocutory decree of dissolution, the 
trial court appointed a certified public accountant (CPA) to pre-
pare a financial report on the couple's community assets, and 
ordered the parties to turn over all necessary documents to the 
accountant. When the issues of property division and support 
were brought to trial almost four years later, the court found 
that the husband had willfully disobeyed the discovery order, 
and precluded him from introducing evidence of specified 
financial transactions. On appeal by the husband from the judg-
ment dividing community property and awarding child and 
spousal support, the court of appeal affirmed. Holding that the 
trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the evidence 
of financial transactions, the court pointed out that the husband, 
despite repeated court orders to deliver documents, had never 
supplied meaningful information concerning the couple's 
financial situation. The court further held that 1) the trial court 
had properly valued community assets at a date near that of 
separation rather than trial, 2) the evidence was sufficient to 
support a finding that the husband had misappropriated a com-
munity bank account, 3) an award to the wife of one-half the 
amount involved in the bank account in addition to one-half of 
the other property did not allow her a double recovery, and 4) 
the trial court did not err in ordering the husband to pay ten 
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percent interest on the unpaid balance of installments due the 
wife as her share of community property. Marital property dis-
positions are limited by judgment rate of interests, but are con-
trolled by the dictates of fairness and equity under Civil Code 
section 4800. Finally, distinguishing Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 
439 U.S. 572 (1979) as having only addressed benefits under the 
1974 Railroad Retirement Act, the court rejected the husband's 
contention that the trial court had improperly retained jurisdic-
tion to modify any military pension and retirement rights. 
4. Award of Attorney's Fees 
In re Marriage of Pollard, 97 Cal. App. 3d 535, 158 Cal. 
Rptr. 849 (2d Dist. 1979). Pursuant to Civil Code Section 
4370(a), the trial court ordered the husband to pay his ex-wife's 
attorney's fees pursuant to his motion to modify visitation 
rights. Both the husband and wife were welfare recipients. The 
order was to take effect when the husband's income exceeded 
$500.00 per month. Noting that ability to pay is one of four con-
ditions which must be met to warrant an allowance of attorney's 
fees, the court of appeal reversed, holding that since both parties 
were legitimately on welfare and there was no showing of any 
reasonable expectation of changed financial circumstances, it 
was an abuse of discretion to impose on one of the parties an 
obligation to pay the attorney contracted by the other. 
5. Finality of Decree Dividing Community Property 
In re Marriage of Shanahan, 95 Cal. App. 3d 295, 157 Cal. 
Rptr. 30 (2d Dist. 1979). An action for dissolution was consoli-
dated with an earlier separate maintainance action in which a 
final decree had been entered establishing the family residence 
as community property, and setting forth the circumstances 
under which it could be sold. The trial court, in entering the 
interlocutory decree, found that the earlier provision pertaining 
to the family home was meant to be a form of support and 
therefore modified the provisions by ordering the immediate sale 
of the property. The court of appeal reversed, holding that once 
it has become final, a decree dividing community property is not 
subject to modification by a later decree, whether in the original 
action or a subsequent one. The court found that a stipulation in 
the separate maintenance action, and the decree based upon it, 
expressly declared that the order pertaining to the family home 
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was intended to be a division of the community property of the 
marriage . 
. 
6. Modification of Property Settlement 
In re Marriage of Kaufman, 101 Cal. App. 3d 147, 161 Cal. 
Rptr. 538 (2d Dist. 1980). The trial court approved terms of a 
property division stipulated to in open court by a husband and 
wife and ordered the wife's attorney to prepare the written or-
der. Subsequently, counsel for the parties exchanged correspon-
dence which discussed terms not previously agreed upon; a mod-
ified judgment was approved by both attorneys and signed by 
the court. Two and one-half years later, the husband instituted 
an action to conform the judgment to the original stipulation 
and order, contending that there were clerical discrepancies be-
tween the stipulation and order and the signed judgment. The 
wife asserted that the signed judgment accurately reflected mod-
ifications discussed in the correspondence between the attor-
neys. The trial court gave little weight to the correspondence, 
viewing it as self-serving hearsay, and viewed the discrepancies 
as clerical errors to be corrected in conformance with the origi-
nal stipulation. The court of appeal affirmed, holding that there 
was no direct evidence that the husband consented to anything 
but the terms of the original stipulation and that any substan-
tive modifications agreed to by counsel were not binding. 
In re Marriage of Neilsen, 100 Cal. App. 3d 874, 161 Cal. 
Rptr. 272 (1st Dist. 1980). Pursuant to a dissolution, the parties 
signed a property settlement agreement containing a spousal 
support provision, and incorporated but did not merge it into 
the final judgment. Six years later, the wife requested and was 
granted a modification of spousal support. The husband con-
tended unsuccessfully, that the court lacked jurisdiction to mod-
ify the support provision because the property settlement agree-
ment had not been merged into the dissolution decree. The 
court of appeal reversed. The court noted that under Civil Code 
section 4811, spousal support provisions of property settlement 
agreements are generally subject to judicial modification unless 
the agreement specifically provides to the contrary. The code 
section makes the concept of merger irrelevant to the determina-
tion of whether or not a court may modify a marriage settlement 
agreement. In the instant case, however, language in the final 
paragraph of the property settlement agreement stated that it 
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"shall not depend for its effectiveness on [court] approval, nor 
be affected thereby." This language was sufficient to bar judicial 
modification. . 
7. Adjudication of Issues After Death of Party 
In re Marriage of Williams, 101 Cal. App. 3d 507, 161 Cal. 
Rptr. 808 (2nd Dist. 1980). In a dissolution proceeding, the trial 
court awarded the wife temporary custody of the parties' chil-
dren and five months later, the wife became seriously ill. Two 
days before her death, the children's father petitioned the court 
for custody. At the same time, the wife's mother and brother 
moved for joinder in the dissolution. proceedings, seeking cus-
tody based on an allegation that the father was unfit. The trial 
court denied the joinder motion on the grounds that the wife's 
death terminated the dissolution proceeding as a matter of law 
and therefore there was no pending action to which the mother 
and brother could be joined. The court of appeal affirmed, hold-
ing that when a party to a dissolution dies, the court has the 
power only to enter judgment in conformity with issues adjudi-
cated before the death. Because the motion for joinder was not 
adjudicated before the wife died, any right petitioners had in the 
dissolution proceeding was terminated, and the court had no 
choice but to deny their motion. 
H. PENSION AND DISABU,ITY BENEFITS 
1. Res Judicata Effect of Dissolution Decree 
Henn v. Henn, 26 Cal. 3d 323, 605 P.2d 10, 161 Cal. Rptr. 
502 (1980). A wife's community property interest in her hus-
band's matured federal military retirement pension was not 
mentioned in their property settlement agreement or in the dis-
solution decree. Two years later, the wife moved for an order to 
show cause why the retirement pension should not be divided as 
community property. Her motion was denied on the grounds 
that absent extrinsic fraud or mistake, the court has no jurisdic-
tion to modify a property settlement agreement which has been 
incorporated into a final judgment of dissolution. Approximately 
two and one-half years later, the wife filed a complaint in the 
superior court asking for 1) a determination that her husband's 
military pension was community property to the extent it was 
earned during their marriage; 2) a full accounting of all pension 
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payments received by her husband, and 3) a division of the com-
munity property portion of the pension. Her husband raised the 
defense of res judicata and the trial court entered judgment on 
his behalf. 
The supreme court reversed, holding that while the dissolu-
tion of marriage and property settlement occurred before its rul-
ing that federal military retirement pay is subject to California 
community property law (In re Fithian, 10 Cal. 3d 592,517 P.2d 
449, l11 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1974», the decision was fully retroactive 
in application. The court also held that failure to mention the 
pension in the interlocutory decree did not bar the present pro-
ceeding because the wife's interest in the military pension was 
distinct from her interest in other community property divided 
at the time of dissolution. Because the question of dividing the 
military pension was not before the court issuing the final disso-
lution decree, the decision of that court was not res judicata as 
to the military pension. 
t Mead v. Lachelt, 94 Cal. App. 3d 445, 156 Cal. Rptr. 444 
(1st Dist.), hearing granted, Aug. 22, 1979. The trial court sus-
tained a husband's demurrer to his former wife's action concern-
ing her rights in his military retirement benefits. The court of 
appeal affirmed, holding that the doctrine of res judicata was ap-
plicable to preclude the wife from asserting an interest in her 
husband's military benefits where 1) the marriage had been dis-
solved eight years before without mention of the benefits, and 2) 
the court had failed to reserve jurisdiction to divide the pension 
benefits at a later time. The court further stated that In re Mar-
riage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 544 P.2d 561, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633 
(1976) limited the retroactivity of pension decisions to all cases 
not yet final at that time. 
2. Characterization of Benefits as Disability or Pension 
In re Marriage of Samuels, 96 Cal. App. 3d 122, 158 Cal. 
Rptr. 38 (1st Dist. 1979). In a dissolution proceeding, ninety-
t Because the California Supreme Court has granted a hearing in this case, the 
court of appeal opinion is of no force or effect and is no longer an authoritative state-
ment of any principle of law. 5 CAL. JUR. 2d, Appellate Review § 434 (1952), citing 
Knouse v. Nimocks, 8 Cal. 2d 482, 66 P.2d 438 (1937). This case appears in the Survey 
for the sole purpose of familiarizing the reader with issues presently pending before the 
high court. 
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four percent of a husband's disability annuity was determined to 
be community property and the wife was awarded a one-half in-
terest, payable retroactively. The judgment also determined that 
the wife held a property interest in any fu~ure death benefits 
and enjoined the husband from exercising his right to modify or 
terminate her interest. Due to an injury, the husband had left 
his civil service job when he was fifty years old. He began to 
receive monthly disability benefits reduced in amount due to his 
election to provide death benefits to his surviving spouse. When 
the husband reached sixty-two years of age, he was to be eligible 
for a deferred retirement annuity. The court of appeal reversed 
and remanded, holding that the disability benefits received by 
the husband when he terminated his employment served the 
principal" purpose of compensating him for his injury and were 
his separate property until he reached the age of sixty-two. At 
that time, the disability benefits would become retirement bene-
fits and therefore be community property. Accordingly, the wife 
was entitled to an allocation of the present actuarial value of the 
community interest, or an award of one-half the benefits paid on 
the husband's attaining the age of sixty-two. The court further 
held that because survivorship benefits are payable only to an 
employee's spouse, an ex-wife has no community interest in such 
benefits when dissolution occurs before retirement. Therefore, 
the trial court was in error in attempting to restrain the husband 
from terminatilllg or modifying the existing survivorship benefits. 
In re Marriage of Reyes, 97 Cal. App. 3d 876, 159 Cal. Rptr. 
84 (5th Dist. 1979). In a dissolution proceeding, the wife joined 
the husband's pension trust fund as a party and secured a de-
cree ordering direct payments to her. Upon the fund's unsuc-
cessful appeal from judgment, the wife moved the trial court to 
assess attorney fees against the fund but the trial court denied 
the motion. The court of appeal affirmed, holding that Civil 
Code section 4370 explicitly restricts the court's authority to or-
der the payment of attorney fees to "the husband or wife, father 
or mother", and there is nothing in the statute's legislative his-
tory or in case law that would authorize an interpretation al-
lowing such an order against any other party in a dissolution 
proceeding. Generally attorney fees are not recoverable from an 
opposing party in the absence of express statutory or contractual 
authority (Code of Civil Procedure section 1021) or in excep-
tional circumstances. The wife failed to bring her case within 
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any of the specified exceptions. The court also rejected the wife's 
contention, made for the first time on oral argument, that she 
was entitled to attorney fees under 29 USC section 1132(g) 
which authorizes an award of attorney fees to a "participant, 
beneficiary or fiduciary." The court held that the wife's failure 
to raise that argument at trial or in her opening brief consti-
tuted a waiver. 
In re Marriage of Webb, 94 Cal. App. 3d 335, 156 Cal. Rptr. 
334 (1st Dist. 1979). In a dissolution of a twenty-five year mar-
riage, the trial court 1) found that the husband's police pension 
was for disability and would remain his separate property even 
after he reached retirement age despite the fact that his contri-
bution to the retirement fund during marriage was community 
property, 2) ordered" the husband to pay his wife spousal support 
for three years, followed by step-down support for seven years 
and termination thereafter, and 3) valued the goodwill of the 
husband's business. The court of appeal reversed the characteri-
zation of the disability pension, reversed the termination of 
spousal support, and affirmed the rest of the judgment. The 
court determined that the community interest in the pension 
was equal to the ratio between the number of years the husband 
worked as a police officer during the marriage and the total 
number of years from the date of his hiring to the date he would 
become eligible for longevity retirement benefits. Noting that 
the city charter provided for a recalculation of the benefits re-
ceived by a police officer who is retired for disability once the 
officer reached the age for longevity retirement, the court con-
cluded that the primary purpose of benefits after retirement is 
to provide for the support of the police officer and his family, 
not to compensate him for loss of earnings resulting from disa-
bility. The court also held that the trial court erred in terminat-
ing spousal support at a certain date without reserving jurisdic-
tion over the matter. 
Goins v. Board of Pension Commissioners, 96 Cal. App. 3d 
1005, 158 Cal. Rptr. 470 (2d Dist. 1979). The trial court granted 
summ~ judgment to defendant when a widow of a former po-
lice officer brought an action to compel payment of a pension 
under the terms of the city charter. Her husband had taken dis-
ability retirement after nineteen years of service in the police 
department. She had married his almost two years before he 
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died from non-service causes and almost seven years after he be-
gan to collect retirement pay. She sought benefits under provi-
sions of the charter providing that an annual pension of forty 
percent of the highest salary will be paid to the widow of any 
member of the police department who has served five years or 
more and dies from causes other than those arising from the 
performance of his duties. To be eligible, the widow must be 
married to the member at least one year prior to his death. The 
court of appeal reversed with directions to enter judgment for 
the plaintiff. Rejecting defendant's argument that the term "any 
member" should be construed as limited to persons in active ser-
vice, the court held that the plaintiff satisfied all of the require-
ments of a literal reading of the city charter and was therefore 
eligible for t1;le pension. 
3. Classification of Benefits as Separate or Community 
Property 
t In re Marriage of Milhan, 97 Cal. App. 3d 41, 158 Cal. 
Rptr. 523 (2d Dist. 1979), hearing granted, Nov. 15, 1979. In a 
dissolution proceeding, the trial court ordered community divi-
sion of the husband's retirement pay and of the case surrender 
value of two military life insurance policies, and awarded the 
wife attorney's fees. The judgment was entered pursuant to a 
decision of the California Supreme Court which had reversed the 
trial court's earlier adjudication, In re Marriage of Milhan, 13 
Cal. 3d 129, 528 P.2d 1145, 117 Cal. Rptr. 809 (1974), cert. den., 
421 U.S. 976 (1975), that these assets were the husband's sepa-
rate property. The court of appeal reversed, noting that a recent 
United States Supreme Court decision (Hisquierdo v. His-
quierdo, 439 U.S. 572 (1979» was controlling. The appellate 
court held that military retirement pay, being non attachable 
under the doctrine of federal sovereign immunity, remains the 
separate property of the former serviceman to whom it is paya-
ble. The court noted that while special legislation was enacted to 
permit garnishment of a civil servant's retirement benefits for 
t Because the California Supreme Court has granted a hearing in this case, the 
court of appeal opinion is of no force or effect and is no longer an authoritative state-
ment of any principle of law. 5 CAL. JUR. 2d, Appellate Review § 434 (1952), citing 
Knouse v. Nimocks, 8 Cal. 2d 482, 66 P.2d 438 (1937). This case appears in the Survey 
for the sole purpose of familiarizing the reader with issues presently pending before the 
high court. 
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community property purposes, no comparable provision allows 
such garnishment of a former serviceman's pay. The court also 
held that the trial court's award of half the cash value of the 
military life insurance policies to the wife would effectively nul-
lify the beneficiary election given to insured servicemen by Con-
gress. Finally, the court ruled that because the husband's con-
tentions were upheld in full, the trial court's award of attorney's 
fees to the wife was erroneous. 
In re Marriage of Lionberger, 97 Cal. App. 3d 56, 158 Cal. 
Rptr. 535 (2d Dist. 1979). In a dissolution proceeding, the trial 
court entered an interlocutory judgment providing that 1) 
spousal support to the wife should terminate after five years, 
and 2) the interest of the husband in a union pension was com-
munity property. On appeal by the wife and the pension trust, 
the court of appeal modified the judgment insofar as it declared 
the wife's interest in the pension to be alienable, inheritable and 
assignable. The court held that the termination of spousal sup-
port after five years was binding; the wife's failure to object at 
the time the trial court included the provision in the interlocu-
tory decree amounted to an implied waiver of her right to raise 
that contention on appeal. The fact that the wife objected to the 
provision in an attorney's conference in chambers was irrelevant 
since there was no record of the conference. The court rejected 
the trust's contention that the provisions of the Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) preempted state law 
and precluded the application of California community property 
law to the distribution of benefits, finding that the nature of the 
action fell within the exception of ERISA and conferred concur-
rent jurisdiction on the state. U.S. Appeal Pending. 
In re Marriage of Orr, 95 Cal. App. 3d 561, 157 Cal. Rptr. 
301 (2d Dist.), hearing denied, Oct. 11, 1979. In a dissolution 
proceeding, the court of appeal affirmed a trial court ruling that 
Veterans Administration disability compensation was the hus~ 
band's separ~te property. The court held that Congress made 
veterans' disability benefits free from community property 
claims of spouses by 1) protecting those benefits by the anti-
attachment provisions of the Veterans Benefits Act (38 U.S.C. 
section 3101), 2) providing that attachment is not allowed for 
child and spousal support against payments made by the Veter-
ans Administration as compensation for service-connected disa-
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bility, at least when the disability payments wholly displace re-' 
tirement pay (52 U.S.C. section 662 subdivision (f)(2), and (3» 
specifically excluding any community property division from the 
definition of alimony (42 U.S.C. section 662(c». Under the 
supremacy clause of the United States Constitution, California's 
community property law must defer to the specific provisions in 
the Veterans Benefits Act designed to protect those benefits. 
The court also held that the trial court acted within its discre-
tion in refusing to award the wife spousal support and in termi-
nating jurisdiction over the case since the husband was totally 
disabled and the wife was gainfully employed. 
In re Marriage of Forrest, 97 Cal. App. 3d 850, 159 Cal. 
Rptr. 229 (4th Dist. 1979). In a dissolution proceeding, the trial 
court entered an interlocutory judgment awarding the wife a 
community property interest in her husband's military retire-
ment pension, and denying the husband a community share in 
his wife's right to reinstate her federal civil service retirement 
benefits. The court of appeal affirmed, holding that the wife's 
pension asset was not only not vested but also nonexistent, sub-
ject to reinstatement only if she resumed employment with the 
federal government and redeposited some $6,500.00 of with-
drawn contributions. The wife had withdrawn the contributions 
during her mm'riage and presumably used them for community 
purposes. The community, therefore, had not been depleted as 
would be the case if she had been contributing all along to a 
nonvested pension. The court held that her present contribu-
tions were from separate property and that the trial court prop-
erly refused to divide so tenuous an asset. The court further 
held that the husband's military retirement benefits were com-
munity property. 
4. Rights of Divorced Spouse to Division of ERISA Pension 
In re Marriage of Pilatti, 96 Cal. App. 3d 63, 157 Cal. Rptr. 
594 (4th Dist. 1979), modified, 96. Cal. App. 3d 626e, 157 Cal. 
Rptr. 594, cert. denied sub nom, Trustees of Operating Engi-
neers Pension Trust v. Pilatti, 100 S. Ct. 1276 (1980). In a disso-
lution proceeding, the wife joined the trustees of her husband's 
pension trust as third party. The trial court' ordered the trustees 
to pay one half the husband's retirement benefits directly to the 
wife. The trust came under the Federal Employee Retirement 
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Income Security Act (ERISA), under which benefits may be paid 
only to participants or, upon death, to the surviving spouse, des-
ignated beneficiary, or estate. The trustees appealed. The court 
of appeal affirmed, holding that 1) ERISA gives state courts con-
current jurisdiction in actions to enforce· a participant's rights 
under the plan, and 2) the wife was an owner of her share of the 
benefits under community property status and thus was a "par-
ticipant" in the pension by the operation of law. 
5. Retirement Benefits Omitted From Dissolution Decree 
In re Marriage of Snyder, 95 Cal. App. 3d 636, 157 Cal. 
Rptr. 196 (4th Dist. 1979). Plaintiff's complaint sought a one-
half interest in her ex-husband's retirement benefits, which were 
vested and matured at the time the final judgment of dissolution 
was entered. The trial court sustained a husband's demurrer, 
without leave to amend, on the basis of res judicata. The court 
of appeal reversed, holding that the doctrine of res judicata can-
not be based on reference or surmise. At an uncontested hearing, 
the parties omitted reference to retirement benefits in their 
pleadings and stipulated that all community property had been 
listed. The trial court was thus precluded from performing its 
duty to divide the community retirement benefits, and the doc-
trine of res judicata would not apply. 
6. Calculation of Community Interest in Retirement Benefits 
In re Marriage of Poppe, 97 Cal. App. 3d 1, 158 Cal. Rptr. 
500 (4th Dist. 1979). The trial court: 1) denied the request of a 
former husband that spousal support for his wife be decreased 
or terminated; and 2) granted the wife a modification of the 
prior dissolution judgment by fixing her interest in the hus-
band's Naval Reserve pension on the basis of the time rule (one-
half the ratio between number of years of service during mar-
riage to the number of total qualifying years). The court of ap-
peal reversed the lower court as to the extent of the wife's inter-
est in the pension, but affirmed in all other respects. The court 
held that the apportionment of retirement benefits on the basis 
of the time rule was appropriate only where the amount of bene-
fits was substantially related to the number of years of service. 
The Naval Reserve pension is calculated on a point system-one 
point for each drill while a reserve, and one point for each day 
on active duty. The husband served nine years on active duty 
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prior to marriage, and twenty-seven years in the reserve during 
marriage. While only one-third of the total points were earned 
during the marl'iage, by using time rule calculations, the commu-
nity interest in the pension amounted to almost nine-tenths. 
Since no substantial relationship existed between benefits and 
length of service, the trial court abused its discretion in using 
the time rule for its calculations. 
I. PATERNITY ACTIONS 
1. Effect 0/ Failure to Dispute Paternity in Dissolution 
Proceedings 
In re Marriage 0/ Guardino, 95 Cal. App. 3d 77, 156 Cal. 
Rptr. 883 (1st lDist. 1979). The trial court granted a husband's 
motion to set aside portions of a dissolution judgment declaring 
him to be the father of his former wife's child, and ordering him 
. to pay child support. His motion was based on an allegation that 
his wife had fraudulently led him to believe he was the child's 
legal father. The trial court found that the husband' attorney in 
the dissolution failed to inquire into the circumstances sur-
rounding the birth of the child and failed to inform him that the 
child was concllusively presumed to be the issue of his wife's 
prior marriage. The court of appeal reversed, holding that the 
trial court abused its discretion in setting aside the contested 
portions of the judgment since the husband was aware that his 
former wife was married to another man when she became preg-
nant and that she was having sexual relations with both men 
during" the conception period. Therefore, the failure of his attor-
ney to inform the husband that the child was conclusively pre-
sumed to be the issue of the prior marriage was not a proper 
ground on which to set aside the judgment. The court further 
held that the issue of paternity decided in the interlocutory de-
cree, was res judicata. 
Brown v. Superior Court, 98 Cal. App. 3d 633, 159 Cal. 
Rptr. 604 (1st Dist. 1979). In a proceeding by a wife for in-
creased child support, her ex-husband defended on the ground 
that he was not the father of the child. The trial court ruled in 
his favor, rejecting the wife's contention that the prior divorce 
decree was res judicata on the paternity issue. The trial court 
also granted the ex-husband's motion for a blood test of his ex-
wife and the child, and to depose the child. The husband stated 
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that he did not try to establish lack of paternity at the original 
poceeding ten years before on his attorney's advice that it would 
be too difficult to prove. The court of appeal directed the trial 
court to vacate its order and to enter an order granting the ex-
wife's motion to quash the deposition of the child. The court 
held that the paternity determination in the default divorce de-
cree was res judicata in the absence of extrinsic fraud or mistake 
and that the ex-husband had shown no evidence of such 
circumstances. 
2. Constitutionality of Paternity Agreement Statute 
County of Ventura v. Castro, 93 Cal. App. 3d 462, 156 Cal. 
Rptr. 66 (2d Dist. 1979). In accordance with an agreement be-
tween the district attorney and defendant, the trial court en-
tered judgment pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code sec-
tion 11476.1 which authorizes judgment establishing paternity 
and order of child support. The trial court denied the defen-
dant's motion to set aside the judgment. The court of appeal 
reversed holding that Welfare and Institutions Code section 
11476.1 is constitutionally defective in that 1) it makes no provi-
sion for the protection of the non-custodial parent's due process 
rights to notice and hearing, 2) it fails to address the manner in 
which a defendant can waive his rights to a hearing and 3) it 
makes no provision for a prejudgment judicial determination on 
the issue of waiver. A judgment entered accordingly might de-
prive a defendant of his personal property and, subsequently, 
his freedom. The court saw no distinction between the confes-
sion of judgments statutes (Code of Civil Procedure sections 
1132-1134, struck down by the supreme court on due process 
grounds) and the agreement for judgment statute embodied in 
Welfare and Institutions Code section 11476.1. 
3. Representation of Indigent Male in Paternity Action 
Littlefield v. Superior Court, 98 Cap. App. 3d 652, 160 Cal. 
Rptr. 175 (2d Dist. 1979). The trial court appointed the public 
defender to represent an indigent man in an action by the 
county seeking to establish paternity of and support for two mi-
nor children. The court of appeal ordered the trial court to va-
cate its order of appointment, holding that the court acted in 
excess of its jurisdiction. Government Code section 27706 sets 
forth the authorized duties of the county public defender who is 
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empowered to act in a limited number of narrowly defined civil 
actions. An action to establish paternity and enforce child sup-
port is not one of those actions. 
4. Appointment of Guardian m County Reimbursement 
Action 
D.G. v. Superior Court, 100 Cal. App. 3d 535, 161 Cal. Rptr. 
117 (4th Dist. 1980). The trial court denied a mother's motion to 
have herself appointed guardian ad litem for her minor child 
rather than the court-appointed guardian. The child had been 
named as plaintiff in an action by the county to establish pater-
nity, for child support and to obtain ,reimbursement of welfare 
funds expended on the child's behalf. The mother sought a writ 
of mandate to compel the trial court to grarit her motion for 
substitution and the court of appeal denied the writ. Following 
petition to the Supreme Court, the matter was remanded to the 
court of appeal with directions to issue an alternative writ. Sub-
sequently, the court of appeal denied the mother's petition, 
holding that although the district attorney appointed the guard-
ian ad litem pursuant to the Uniform Parentage Act (Civil Code 
§ 7008), which potentially broadened the scope of the proceed-
ings, the county's complaint asked for no more than was proper 
within the context of an action for reimbursement of welfare 
funds and to establish paternity under Welfare and Institutions 
Code section 11350.1. The trial court, therefore, rightfully. 
treated the appointment of the guardian ad litem as having been 
made pursuant to the general authority of Code of Civil Proce-
dure section 372, which permits the appointment of a guardian 
ad litem by the trial court whenever expedient. As to the sub-
stantive issues, the court held that 1) the mother failed to estab-
lish that the present guardian ad litem was not properly dis-
charging his duties or had a conflict of interest, and 2) there was 
no established preference to have the mother serve as guardian 
ad litem. 
J. MERETRICIOUS RELATIONSHIPS 
1. Imputed Negligence of Cohabiting Partner 
Planck v. Hartung, 98 Cal. App. 3d 838, 159 Cal. Rptr. 673 
(3d Dist. 1979). The trial court rejected the plaintiff's contention 
that the negligence of a man could be imputed to the woman he 
Women's Law Forum 
46
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 10, Iss. 3 [1980], Art. 14
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol10/iss3/14
1980] CALIFORNIA LAW SURVEY 1333 
lived with. The plaintiff based his allegation on the ground that 
the man and woman, by living together, were engaged in a joint 
venture and that the negligence of one could be imputed to the 
other. The court of appeal affirmed, reasoning that there was 
nothing in the case to suggest any business purpose, profit mo-
tive or tangible benefit to the couple from their living arrange-
ment other than that which was typical of all families; therefore, 
the relationship did not become a joint venture for purposes of 
vicarious or imputed liability. 
2. Application of Marital Communications Privilege 
People v. Delph, 94 Cal. App. 3d 411, 156 Cal. Rptr. 422 (2d 
Dist. 1979). The trial court allowed a woman, with whom defen-
dant had lived for four years and with whom she had had a 
child, to testify that the defendant had made statements to her 
regarding bomb threats. The court of appeal affirmed, holding 
that the trial court was correct in refusing to apply the marital 
communications privilege with respect to the woman's testi-
mony. The court stated that a valid marriage is a prerequisite to 
the exercise of the privilege and that it is for the legislature to 
determine whether meretricious relationships deserve the same 
statutory protection. 
K. LEGISLATION 
1. Marriage and Dissolution 
A.B. 537 - Waters 
Chapter 164 
Statutes of 1979 
Dissolution. Allows final judgment of marriage to be filed 
even if appeal or motion for new trial has been filed absent spec-
ified objection in the notice of appeal or motion for new trial. 
A.B. 746 - McVittie 
Chapter 621 
Statutes of 1979 
Marriage. Authorizes the court· to impose a fee to cover 
counselling costs for persons under the age of eighteen who are 
participating in pre-material counseling provided by the county. 
47
Levine: California Law Survey
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1980
1334 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10:1287 
2. Community Property 
A.B. 1826 - Kapiloff 
Chapter 638 
Statutes of 1979 
Personal Injury Damages. Designates money received in 
settlement of an accident or injury as separate property if the 
accident or injury occurred after separation of the spouses. 
3. Child Custody and Control 
A.B. 363 - Chappie 
Chapter 69 
Statutes of 1979 
Child Support Offsets. Allows Social Security payments to 
be credited toward amount of child support ordered by the 
court. 
A.B. 381 - Boatwright 
Chapter 11.70 
Statutes of 1979 
Child 0/ Prior Marriage. Requires all the community prop-
erty interest of an adoptive parent or natural parent to be avail-
able for child support of a child by a prior marriage. Makes 
other changes iin welfare laws. 
A.B. 1480 - Imbrecht 
Chapter 915 
Statutes of 1979 
Joint Custody Provisions: Specifies circumstances in which 
a presumption favoring joint custody shall operate, and provides 
that access to records and information pertaining to a minor 
child may not be denied a parent because she is .not the child's 
custodial parent. 
S.B. 477 - Smith 
Chapter 204 
Statutes of 1979 
Joint Custody Authorized. Specifies the circumstances in 
which joint custody would be in the best interest of the child 
and specifically authorizes· such an award of joint custody in 
other cases as designated by the court. 
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S.B. 540 - Presley 
Chapter 752 
Statutes of 1979 
1335 
Consent to Adoption. Requires consent of natural father 
where adoption of a child is being considered; clarifies who can 
be considered as a natural father in paternity questions. 
4. Spousal Support 
A.B. 437 - McAlister 
Chapter 912 
Statutes of 1979 
Unemployed Spouse. Requires the courts, in awarding 
spousal support, to consider the extent to which the spouse's 
earning capacity was impaired by periods of unemployment 
during marriage because of domestic duties. 
5. Pregnancy and Childbirth 
A.B. 121 - Berman 
Chapter 13 
Statutes of 1979 
Discrimination Based on Pregnancy. Makes technical 
changes in laws prohibiting discrimination on the basis of child-
birth, pregnancy or related medical conditions. 
A.B. 873 - Agnos 
Chapter 657 
Statutes of 1979 
Genetic Disease Testing. Provides for an ongoing appropri-
ation for Genetic Disease Testing Unit in the Department of 
Health. 
A.B. 1097 - Rosenthal 
Chapter 629 
Statutes of 1979 
Prenatal Diagnosis of Genetic Disorders. Requires that 
health insurers offer coverage of genetic testing in cases of high 
risk pregnancies, and requires that group policies offer coverage 
on terms agreed upon by insurer and group policy holder. Also 
requires prospective policy holders to be informed of coverage 
availability. 
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S.B. 775 - Keene 
Chapter 1141 
Statutes of 1979 
Perinatal Care. Establishes regional perinatal transport sys-
tems for high risk pregnant women and infants and appropriates 
$921,000 for the program which is to run until January 1, 1985. 
S.B. 776 - Keene 
Chapter 331 
Statutes of 1979 
Perinatal Program. Requires the Department of Health 
Services to maintain a program addressing the special needs of 
high risk pregnant women and infants particularly in under-
served geographic areas. 
m. LABOR LAW 
A. EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 
1. Recovery oj' Back Wages for Equal Pay Violation 
t Jones v. Tracy School District, 93 Cal. App. 3d 552, 155 
Cal. Rptr. 804 (3d Dist. 1979), hearing granted, July 25, 1979. In 
an action by an employee for back pay under Labor Code sec-
tion 1197.5 which requires equal pay for equal work without re-
gard to the ser. of the employee, the trial court granted plain-
tiff's motion fol' summary judgment but limited recovery of back 
wages to a two-year period prior to commencement of the action. 
Plaintiff had sought recovery of back wages for the entire six-
year period during which she was underpaid solely because she 
was a woman. The court of appeal affirmed, holding that in an 
action for back pay, a new cause of action accrues with each dis-
criminatory pay day, and the statute of limitations begins to run 
from that time. Thus, the court held that the two-year period of 
limitation contained in Labor Code section 1197.5(h) limited re-
covery to the difference in wages paid within two years of com-
mencement of the action. Further, the court held that an award 
t Because the California Supreme Court has granted a hearing in this case, the 
court of appeal opinion is of no force or effect and is no longer an authoritative state-
ment of any principle of law. 5 CAL. JUR. 2d, Appellate Review § 434 (1952), citing 
Knouse v. Nimocks, 8 Cal. 2d 482, 66 P.2d 438 (1937). This case appears in the Survey 
for the sole purpose of familiarizing the reader with issues presently pending before the 
high court. 
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of attorney's fees under Labor Code section 1197.5(g) is discre-
tionary in the trial court and the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in denying plaintiff's request for attorney's fees. 
2. Constitutionality of Affirmative Action Program for Public 
Employees 
Minnick v. Department of Corrections, 95 Cal. App. 3d 506, 
157 Cal. Rptr. 260 (lst Dist. 1979), modified on denial of rehear-
ing, 96 Cal. 3d 626a, cert. granted, 100 S. Ct. 3055 (1980) (No. 
79-1213, 1979 Term). The trial court granted a declaratory judg-
ment in favor of two male Caucasians who had brought an ac-
tion against the Department of Corrections and the Correctional 
Officers Association alleging that the defendants had discrimi-
nated against employees of the department by carrying out an 
affirmative action program. The trial court also issued a perma-
nent injunction restraining, with qualification, hiring or promo-
tion based on preference by race of sex. The court of appeal re-
versed, holding that the department's practices were permissible 
under both the federal and state equal" protection clause to the 
extent that noncontrolling preferences resulted in some advan-
tage to women and minorities because such practices were neces-
sary to promote the compelling interest of the state in the 
proper management of its correctional system. 
B. UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE BENEFITS 
1. Permissibility of Questions Regarding Pregnancy in Deter-
mining Eligibility. 
Gunn v. Employment Development Department, 94 Cal. 
App. 3d 658, 156 Cal. Reptr. 584 (2d Dist. 1979). The trial court 
denied a woman's petition for writ of mandate to direct the Em-
ployment Development Board and the Unemployment Insurance 
Appeals Board to set aside their decision that she was ineligible 
for unemployment insurance benefits because she refused to an-
swer an interviewer's questions regarding her health and her 
possible pregnancy. The court of appeal reversed and held that 
an inquiry into the potential effect of pregnancy on a claimant's 
health is constitutionally permissible only if conducted in the 
least intrusive manner possible. At the time of her hearing, the 
claimant provided the judge with a certificate of good health 
from her physician, but refused to answer any questions about 
her physical condition. The court of appeal stated that the cer-
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tificate from the woman's physician constituted prima facie 
proof that she Vias eligible for benefits, and further questions re-
garding her pregnancy and health were an unwarranted invasion 
of privacy. 
C. LEGISLATION 
1. Employment Discrimination 
A.B. 740 - Chacon 
Chapter 997 
Statutes of 1979 
Unemployment Data. Authorizes the State Employment 
Development Department to collect data on comparative unem-
ployment rates among various age, sex, and ethnic groups and 
on the length of time and types of unemployment experienced 
by the above-named groups. 
S.B. 213 - Greene 
Chapter 1181 
Statutes of 1979 
Jailers. Prohibits sex discimination in appointments or 
work assignments in county jails. 
2. Wages, Hours and Benefits 
A.B. 58 - Robinson 
Chapter 76 
Statutes of 1979 
Worker's Compensation: Volunteers. Broadens the exclu-
sion of volunteers from workers' compensation to exclude volun-
teers in all nonprofit organizations and redefines volunteer ser-
vice for workers' compensation eligibility. 
A.B. 105 - Fenton 
Chapter 222 
Statutes of 1979 
Discontinuance of Health Benefits. Requires public and 
private employers to give covered employees fifteen days written 
notice of discontinuance of medical, surgical or hospital benefits. 
S.B. 371 - Mills 
Chapter 751 
Statutes of 1979 
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Leisure Sharing. Establishes an experimental "leisure 
sharing" employment program whereby employees are allowed 
to voluntarily cut back hours of work; federal funds are to be 
sought for implementation. 
3. Consideration of Volunteer Experience 
A.B. 866 - Levine 
Chapter 544 
Statutes of 1979 
Employment Applications. Requires all applications for 
employment with the California State University and Colleges to 
include a place to list volunteer experience, and for such experi-
ence to be considered if it is relevant to the job being applied 
for; notice of consideration of volunteer experience must be dis-
played on the application form. 
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